Arab Transformation and the Implications on State Systems and Social Contract Dynamics

Regional Political Dialogue 2015, Beirut

Report
Contents

Background ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Phase One: The Arab State and its transformations: ................................................................. 3
  Dialogue One: Examining the Arab Springs and its implications ............................................. 5
  Dialogue Two: The Arab Spring: how can we understand it four years after?....................... 10
Phase Two: National and Regional Dialogues: Action Plan and Steps
Forward ............................................................................................................................................... 11
Annex: Submitted Projects: .............................................................................................................. 13
Background

Since the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings in 2011, the state has been put center stage of the political debate. Effectively, popular protests that spread in several countries in order to demand the fall down of regimes and chant for radical reforms specifically on economic, social and political levels, can be equally be understood as a call to reconsider and refashion state-society relations. In fact, movements of contestations were ultimately directed against the prevailing social-contract between the state and the society. While the attention was given to the “fall of the regime”, people on the streets were by the same token rethinking the role of the state and its role in society. In other terms, protestors were advocating for an active and positive role for the state in their everyday life specifically with “more state” on the level of social and economic levels and “less state” on the military and surveillance level. Therefore, after four years after the outburst of these events, it becomes imperative to consider the state that has emerged since, and which is still being in the process of formation.

The objective of this project is to shed light on some of the important questions that the Uprisings have raised specifically in relation to the state transformations. These questions are at the heart of the ongoing project of statecraft in the Arab world. In addition, the project aims at pointing to some new possible areas that require further exploration in the pursuit of a new social contract between states and societies in the Arab world in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”.

This project is divided into three phases. Part one tackles the major debate and transformations that have occurred on state-society relations in the Arab world. Part two presents the major discussions and outcomes of the two regional dialogue sessions held in Beirut at the Common Space Initiative (CSI). Part three presents the way forward and the action plan for the implementation of phase two.

The methodology of the work consists on a facilitated regional dialogue among experts representing different Arab countries, such as Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. The two dialogues were supported by a background paper that was developed by the research team at the CSI.
Phase One: The Arab State and its transformations

Since 2011, the Arab world has witnessed unprecedented popular movements that lead to toppling certain regimes either as a result of mass protests (Egypt and Tunis), or indirectly through foreign military interference (Libya) or as a result of a negotiation process that ended in a transition phase (Yemen). At the same time, other Arab countries that witnessed popular movements still undergo violent conflicts that differ in nature from one country to another (Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya). In other countries, such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia, regimes resorted to adopting timid “reforms” in an attempt to avoid the intensification of the popular movements.

Despite the blurred vision about the future of the Arab world, the unprecedented movements have shaken the traditional foundations of the relationship between the state and society. Research conducted on Arab states tends in general to consider the state as an authority completely independent and detached from society. For decades this equation resulted in repressive regimes that controlled and manipulated political, economic, and even religious resources. Equally important were the sporadic yet important protests by the populations which were severely met with violence and political repression.

Many researchers believe that the regimes’ control and manipulation over economic resources and the resort to violence to oppress the society was a detrimental factor behind the Arab spring where the main slogan was “bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity”. Thus, popular movements constituted an attempt to bridge the gap between the state often controlled by a ruling class and business networks on the one hand and the society on the other. Effectively, for the first time, priority has been given, albeit nominally, to the people in an attempt to decide on their future. Subsequently, the slogan “the people want” became the cornerstone in expressing the demands and rights of Arab societies.

First: Problematic issues and questions related to the discussion

During its first months, popular movements in the Arab world appeared as a model worthy of exporting. But they quickly turned, due to several internal and external considerations, into a “scarecrow” used by regimes to threaten and intimidate their peoples with the potential disastrous consequences of such movements on their countries. Although the slogan “the people want to overthrow the regime” was common among many countries, movements had various outcomes that radically differed from one country to another. One major implication of these movements is indeed to distortion of old order, whether on the level of political regimes, regional equilibrium or the foundations of the state.
Based on the above, the popular movements paved the way for a new stage which its outcomes remain till now unclear. In order to better grasp these changes and their impact, three main pillars were identified as essential for understanding the major transformations that have occurred since:

1) the impact on the political regimes, 2) the impact on the nation-state, and finally 3) the impact on the regional level and geopolitical level. Also, it is also crucial to understand the role and activities of the newly emerged social and political forces, in addition to the old actors that are still indeed playing a role in defining the future of the countries in particular and the region in general. What follows is a quick presentation of some main problematic issues that accompanied/resulted from popular movements on the ground since their outbreak and up to this day. These issues constituted the entry point for the regional dialogue that have gathered experts from several Arab countries.

\textit{a- at the level of regimes}

What are the main transformations that affected regimes? Have constitutional changes that took place after the fall of regimes, carry the concerns of popular movements, or they only aimed at absorbing it? Have new constitutions contribute in re-considering the social contract? And finally, would the new legal system contribute in opening participation areas before citizens at the political, social and economic levels?

\textit{b- at the level of the nation-state}

Recently, and after the Arab spring and military conflicts, many maps have been developed that drew new geographic borders on the ashes of the Sykes-Picot borders. Would current transformations affect the borders of existing nation states, either directly or indirectly? Have popular movements contributed in the emergence of ethnic and sectarian identities that lead to questioning the legitimacy of the unified state, opening the door to claims of secession and the formation of new independent states? Or is it that the emergence of such identities is the nothing but the result of regimes and/or external powers manipulating these identities for different interests?

\textit{c- the regional level}

The mass protests were not restricted and confined to the borders of the nation-state. Their echo has impacted other countries but also were impacted by external actors, whether state or non-states actors. This has led to the reconfiguration of the regional status-quo and the emergence of new actors that did not play previously a significant regional role. What is the nature of current regional divisions? Who are the actors and what are the fields of confrontation (ideological, political, economic, religious, sectarian…)? What role did media play on the regional level through satellite channels and social networks? Have media contributed in the formation of a reform power, or have it lead to the fragmentation of such a power by supporting certain forces.
at the expense of others? To what extent does social networking contribute in moving forces of popular movements from the stage of networking on the lowest common denominator to unifying around alternative governance programs and projects?

**d- Forces of change? Future projects and vision**

Finally, and beside the major transformations that have occurred on the three above levels, it is important to inquire about the role of new actors and what role did they play in post-revolution phase. In addition, it is also essential to understand what role did “old actors”, previously part of the “ancien regime”, had in the reconfiguration and reconsolidation of authoritarianism?

Who are the forces or groups that aim today to achieve an actual change in Arab countries? What is the nature of shifts that it aims to achieve? What are their proposals/projects, activities, programs, areas of action and tools? What is the situation of these forces or groups and how able are they to network at the domestic level of each country, as well as at the level of different Arab states? Who are the forces behind the counter-revolution and what are their strategies?

Based these questions, a first Regional Dialogue was held in Beirut on March, 13-14, 2015. The regional dialogue gathered experts from several Arab countries. A second, regional dialogue was held on May 27-28, 2015, to follow-up on the outcomes of the first dialogue and to propose an action plan for the second phase of the project.

**Dialogue One: Examining the Arab Springs and its implications**

The First regional dialogue was intended to discuss the major implications of the Arab spring on state-society relations. Therefore, the dialogue aimed at presenting a general diagnostic on state-society relation in pre-Arab spring phase and the implications of the Arab spring on political regimes, nation-states, and the regional and geopolitical dimensions.

**The regimes: from controlling the society to abandoning it**

Before examining whether there have been fundamental shifts in political regimes as a result of popular movements, it is necessary to briefly describe the features of the Arab regimes, and the way they produced the social contract between the state and society. Arab regimes have moved, in general, from managing and directing society and its resources, to gradually abandoning society and fully laying hold, in different ways, of its resources. Gradually, states institutions started to be controlled by military regimes, security apparatuses but also network of businessmen. These structures controlled state resources to the detriment of the society and its interests.
The majority of Arab regimes were established on traditional and new patronage and partisan networks that infiltrated deep into society and controlled its movement. The ruling elite, therefore, through patronage system or rent weakened and sidelined governmental institutions.

In addition to these mechanisms of control, the gradual adoption by ruling elites in many Arab countries of neoliberal economic policies contributed in causing radical shifts in the relationship between the ruler and society. Subsequently, the ruling elite, that is, the ruling family and its entourage, became the major party that manages the county’s economy. Moreover, it behaved as if resources were private rather than public property. And as a result that have appropriated the resources of the state, which in turn have completely abandon the society.

*The Arab Spring: reshuffling state systems and societal dynamics.*

What follows, is a brief summary on the main conclusions regarding the impact of the Arab Spring on political regimes, nation-states, and geopolitical configurations and dynamics.

**First: Impact on political regimes**

When we observe the Arab scene following the popular movements, we conclude that different models and outcomes resulted from these movements. This means that neither people did not mobilize themselves in the same way nor the regimes’ reactions were not uniform between different countries.

- Complete fusion between the concepts of political system and of state as in the case of Egypt, while the army continues to play a key role in political life;
- Persistence of the relationships between the society and the regime despite popular movements and constitutional changes, as in the case of Morocco;
- Complexity of the relationship between society and the regime as in the case of Bahrain;
- The collapse of both the state and the regime, as in Yemen;
- The collapse of the state and the persistence of the regime, as in Syria;
- Institutional transformation and persistence of the neo-patrimonial mentality, as in the case of Tunisia;
- Regime change and the adoption of a new one that makes the relationship between society and the state more complex, as in the case of Iraq

**Second: The state’s transformation, fading or disintegration**

Based on the above, it has become possible to conclude, in an analytical summary of the stated factors combined, the most important transformations that affected the nature and concept of state after four years of popular movements in the Arab world. These are as follows:

- The national state in the traditional sense is no longer the key to relations between countries. Nowadays non-states actors play a crucial role in negotiating cross-national issues (for instance negotiating peace mechanisms…)
- New prescribed proposals to resolve the situation are worsening the crisis facing the region. These proposals that come from the outside affect the cohesion of the nation state.
This was obvious in the case of Yemen when the United Nations presented federalism as the magical salvation for Yemenis.

- Another key factor to the new transformations undergone by the state is, naturally, the borders’ equation, where day after day the main aspects of the project to efface borders that were drawn based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement become clearer.

Transformations at the level of the state and its cohesion greatly affect the future of the region in general, and the future of the nation state in particular.

Third: Arab popular movements and their regional dynamics

Popular movements that started in many Arab countries were not the result of regional crises, nor did the latter constitute one of their priorities. However, the movements have had their echo on the regional level through different areas.

a- new Regional Players
Different countries have emerged as new players in the region taking advantage of their material, media and military power to extend its political influence and to impose itself as a key player in the Middle East. These newly emerged played have played a great role on the course of events inside states that would historically assume a leading role in the region, such as Egypt and Syria, and inside other states such as Tunis, Libya and Yemen. For instance, Qatar’s role as regional actor coincides, on the one hand, with the declining roles of regional states such as Egypt, and on the other, with the emergence of regional actors from outside the list such as "the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL).

b- the Palestinian Cause
The Palestinian cause has often been the focus of every movement in the Arab world. Since the fifties of the last century, The Arab liberation movement has been directly linked to the Palestinian liberation movement. However, the Palestinian issue was not central to the movements that arose in 2011 in many Arab arenas, for several reasons, mostly: The popular uprisings or Arab revolutions were preoccupied by their situations and internal crises. On the other hand, popular movements gradually shifted from being democratic movements on the street to armed conflicts.

c- the impact of the regional situation internally
Arab movements shed light on the interaction between internal factors and regional and international ones. Therefore, in addition to studying the impact of popular movements on regional balances and alliances, it is essential to study as well the impact of regional and international balances on the popular movement.

d- terrorism and borders
In addition to the above, the growing role of terrorism must be pointed out which has become central in determining the nature of the relationship between states and the ensuing regional balances. It is notable that widespread terrorism is no longer exclusively exported, but has also become domestic industry. This constitutes a reason for concern that terrorist groups have now
local support and a nurturing environment, which was not necessarily the case before, especially that the goal of these terrorist groups, and the expansion of their projects and plans, are not confined to the borders of the national state, a situation that imposes on states a new kind of cooperation.

**e- Economy and the regional impact**

Finally, the economy as key factor that helps identify changes resulting from Arab movements must be emphasized. It is noted that the national income of many Arab states currently witnessing armed conflicts has been largely affected. Syria, for instance, lost between 55% and 60% of its national income. On the other hand, holding companies in the Arab Gulf are experiencing continuous growth (between 7% and 10% during the last four years). It is possible that part of these profits – which are no longer restricted to states’ profits, but now include private capitals – constitute an essential source of funding for cross-border terrorism that fuels local conflicts.

**Fourth: Actors and their scope of mobility**

On the eve when popular movements in the Arab world started, one would not imagine that forces, parties and movements do exist that were able to organize an effective popular movement with the potential of overthrowing regimes and shaking others, despite the existence of a movement that consisted of organized forces, active on the ground within various frames, but that did not form a clear, cohesive and “anti-control” bloc.

Therefore it is crucial to examine to which extent some groups are collaborating together, whether on the national or regional level, in order to develop networks and project that equip them with new vision to face these transformations and prevent the collapse of the state and the reconfiguration of the borders.

In conclusion, some basic questions must be taken into account in order to reach a more accurate understanding of events taking place in the region:

- Forces demanding change still exist despite their ineffectiveness at the moment. But the problem resides in the fact that these groups are yet to develop their project. On the other hand there are two well defined projects: the Islamic project and the national state project. However, under the current transformations both reached an impasse. Is there any alternative project?

- Why no common visions have been developed among the movements’ components in different Arab states?

- Forces/groups demanding the establishment of a “civil state” are many in different Arab countries. However, the aspects of this current remain vague, how then would it be able to formulate and translate its ideas on the ground?

In the framework of thinking about the future of the region, and the form of the state within it, three main problematic issues must be highlighted and clarified; these are:
- The role of Islam: It is obvious that Islam constitute a key element and an entrenched in the Arab world. Religion plays a key role in the daily life of communities. How would this factor be dealt with?
- Minorities in the Arab world are not restricted to religious ones, as many others exist. Therefore, the issue of minorities and identities constitutes a very important issue that should not be neglected. How would it be addressed?
- Security Concerns: No doubt that security constitutes an essential demand for communities. However, this factor deviated the concept of state from one that maintains security into that of a police state. How will security and antiterrorism be reconciled without infringing citizens’ privacies, or bringing back the repressive, military and police state?

Finally, two main additional elements are to be taken into account for the second phase of the project:

First, the regions are witnessing an unprecedented breakdown of the main constitutive pillars for the Arab nation-state, despite the fact that the state itself was still undergoing the process of its formation. In addition, this breakdown is also crumbling the traditional regional equilibrium that has been regulating the geopolitical scene for many decades.

Second, this breakdown is taking place amidst a complete void and the absence of any alternative project hailed by social and political movements; a project that is indeed an alternative to what has been formed by traditional regimes, whether through its historical form or it reconsolidated one.

In sum, the main question that should be addressed is the following: how to face these changes in the region and who are the forces and groups who are working in anticipation of these changes and how?

Therefore, a threefold framework was identified in an attempt to provide enlighten answers to these questions:

1- New Discourses and Cultural elements: An in-depth understanding of the shift in the cultural pillars of the Arab world and the dominant discourses to reform the region, or lack thereof.
2- What are the most effective forces and political groups in the region currently defining the nature of the political field?
3- Who are the new emerging actors that have sought to bring about change and what are their projects and the main challenges that they face?
**Dialogue Two: The Arab Spring: how can we understand it four years after?**

Based on the results of the first conference, members of the Regional Dialogue have decided to meet another time. The main objective of the second regional dialogue was to present ideas and case studies under one of the three above-mentioned vectors (discourse and culture, effective forces, emerging actors). The debate can be summarized as follow:

1 – The role of Culture in developing a “modern” discourse: it was judged necessary to consider the current crises faced the Arab world from a “cultural perspective”. In other terms, what cultural projects are being currently developed and advocated in the Arab world in order to prevent the collapse of the state and of the region in general. More particularly, it is important to map actors, whether political regimes or political groups, who are currently presenting alternatives to the crises of the regions whether against the “reconsolidation of authoritarianism” or the newly emerged “fanatic and extremist” discourses.

2 – Emerging actors in post-Arab spring phase: This variable is indeed essential to understand the impact of the mobilization on the society and what groups have been established in order to prevent new alternatives and new projects, whether feminist groups or other groups that defend minorities (whether societal or religious)… A special attention will be dedicated to study and understand their role in the mobilizations, projects and visions for the future. In fact, looking at these new actors working on the national level contribute to pinpoint potential forces that are ready to bring about change and present serious reforms and contribute in the emergence and development of a new “modern and alternative discourse”.

3 – Effective forces and actors: This variable is dedicated to understand the major transformations that have occurred during the last four years. By looking at the most effective actors it becomes easier to unpack the process of the “revolution” and the “counter-revolution”. This variable will help us further understand the weakness and strengths of the actors and therefore better grasp why some regimes have managed to refashion the old authoritarian ones (Egypt) and revive the “deep state” or alternatively assume a smooth and peaceful transition such as the Tunisian case for instance.

During this dialogue participants presented drafted of their intended research for the second phase of the project. In addition they have also agreed on the main features and guidelines for the second phase of the project, which can be summarized as follow: examine the transformation in the region by studying each country according to the three main pillars:

- The role of Culture in developing a “modern” discourse (culture)
- Emerging actors in post-Arab spring phase (emerging actors)
- Effective forces and actors (effective forces)

In addition to these three papers dedicated to understand the transformation on the level of each country, it was also decided to present a *general contextual paper* that defines the main features and background of the national processes.
All the papers above will address directly the main problematic of the debate: how do these three levels intersect and impact the 1) state in the Arab world, 2) the regional and geopolitical configuration and finally 3) the cultural elements.

Phase Two: National and Regional Dialogues: Action Plan and Steps Forward

After the completion of the first phase of the project, the CSI will launch the second complementary phase of the project. The second phase will be implemented over a period of 24 months. Two main elements will constitute the second phase: national dialogues and regional dialogues.

I. National Dialogues:

The below national dialogue are considered as complementary to the ongoing national dialogues in some countries; but also a entry point to potential National Dialogues in some countries where no similar structures exist to this date.

Step 1: In each country, 4 papers will be prepared and developed on the following 4 themes: 1) culture, 2) emerging actors, 3) effective forces and 4) a general contextual papers.

Step 2: These background papers will constitute elements to open dialogues among practitioners, concerned parties and stakeholders. The objective of these dialogues is twofold:

1) Knowledge Production: after a series of dialogues participants will work to develop the background paper in order to extract from it and from the outcomes of the sessions a road map related to each vector. The road map will highlight and identify the weakness, opportunities and challenges facing the groups working under each theme. The paper will also present some recommendation of how to strength the work on activists on the ground and those who are working under each vector.

2) Network Production: in addition to the road map and the recommendations, the objective is also to establish and empower network and coalition-building among practitioner’s activist, unions etc.

II. Regional Dialogues:

Based on the outcomes of the national dialogues whether through knowledge production of network production, regional forums will be established. The regional dialogues will tackle and discuss three main themes: the major transformations and impact on nation-states (the Arab state), the impact on the Regional equilibrium (geopolitical configuration), and finally the culture element on the level of the Arab region.

The ultimate objective of the dialogues is twofold:
1) Produce knowledge on the future of the region and the major challenges that it faces specifically the future of the Arab state, the regional equilibrium and geopolitical configuration and finally the “cultural element” and its role in reshaping the region.

2) Develop a regional network of stakeholders and practitioners that essentially contribute to prepare alternatives vision (that do not necessarily exist yet in the Arab world), whether on the level of the state in particular or the level of the region in general. These networks will be formed out of actors that can potentially collaborate in different areas, reflect on shared experiences and common challenges.
Annex: Submitted Projects

Below is a sample of the papers presented and discussed during the second regional dialogue.

**Egypt**

I - The paper aims at mapping the main factors that have been crucial in defining the political trajectory in Egypt since 2011. The mapping will take into account the general context of the Egyptian scene which can be summarized in the following: the attempt to spread fatigue amongst the people, the Islamist movements which called for the application of the Shari’a and civil groups who support and often are guided by the Egyptian army, and finally the impact of laws for fighting terrorism and the control of public spaces. In light of these variables, the mapping will focus therefore on six active groups: 1) the army and its role on the economic and political level, 2) President el-Sisi and the institutions directly affiliated to the Presidency, 3) religious institutions specifically the al-Azhar and the Church, 4) institutions such as the ministry and police, and 5) the networks of businessmen, political parties and groups, and finally 6) regional and international actors.

II - In a complementary paper, another study will closely examine the impact of the revolution in Egypt whether on the “old” actors or the “newly” emerged ones. More specifically, the paper attempts to understand the transformations in Egypt through the lens of the “revolution” and the “counter-revolution”. New actors: the revolution have helped with the burgeoning of new actors that agree in general on a number of principles related particularly to freedom, justice and civilian rules as opposed to religious and/or military rules. Despite these common denominators, the new groups did not however agree on a set of challenges: how to govern, how we will govern, and what are the set of values that will guide our work? In addition the paper will address how these groups have disintegrated a set of principles based on which the old regime have successfully consolidated its power: the absence of diversity either through an islamist project or the military rule, full rejection of the militarization and/or policing of the society, the fight against the control of public space, the freedom of women and their rights as equal partners in the revolution and by extension in the society, and finally the social justice. Against the backdrop of the revolutionary forces, the paper will try to unpack the strategies of the “counter-revolution”, which were based primarily on claiming back the patriarchy in the society, or the “father of the nation” in addition to reviving surveillance and police strategies in society.

**Tunisia**

The paper on Tunisia will present an in-depth case study on the transition phase in Tunisia through the role played by major actors in the Tunisian scene. It will shed light on specific and key moments in this phase through a chronological historical examination in an attempt to map the role and projects of several key actors in the transition phase since 2011. These moments are consecutively, the revolution and its aftermath, the Constitutive National Assembly, the National Dialogue with a specific attention given to the role played by the civil society, the electoral elections and its context and outcomes, and finally the government and the coalition building.
The methodology will be based on an in-depth historical reading in order to understand the major transformations, with a specific effort deployed to analyze potential scenarios in the coming years of the future of Tunisia.

**Bahrain**

The study aims at studying major changes that have occurred in the Gulf countries since 2011. It is centered around two axes: 1) studying the strategies and techniques of rules by ruling families in each country in order to preserve its internal unity, amidst growing competitions among family members; its capacity to mobilize internal and external resources that have helped consolidating its own power; such as the use of oil rent in infrastructure projects or empowering the military cooperation among CGG countries. 2) mapping major social mobilizations facing ruling elites. These forces include: traditional structures such as religious leaders, and tribes leaders, and community representatives. The modern structures include: businessmen, intellectuals, unions and political networks. In addition to civil society organizations, which encompass feminist movements, youth, and human rights defenders. And finally, it will look at associations of workers and businessmen in diaspora.

**Palestine**

The Palestinian case is rather different from other countries in the Arab world. In fact, Palestine does not have a nation-state, as a result of the Israeli occupation. This paper will examine the construction of the “political field” in Palestine that emanates often from the prior existence of a nation-state. Therefore, it is important to examine this field against the backdrop of an absent nation-state. In the 60s the Palestinian struggle have greatly contributed to the emergence of a national identity. However, in the last two decades there has been an emergence of sub-national identities, and waning of national unity. The Palestinian case shares same features as the crises of the state in the Arab world, however: the control of ruling and business over state institutions, the use of economic and political repression, the adoption of a new neo-liberal model that weakens the role of the state in social and economic sectors, and the direct foreign interventions in domestic affairs. Therefore, and in light of these features the paper will analyze the development of lack of a national political field after the Oslo accord. It argues that the national political field has been disintegrated into local and diversified ones. It finally proposes elements to reconstruct the social contract in Palestine and reconsolidate a national identity.

**Syria**

Culture constitutes an essential element that helps us understand major transformations in the region. Effectively, culture can also contribute to face the major challenges in the region specifically with the burgeoning of terrorist groups and fanatical ideas. The paper will look at the Syrian crises from the perspective and role of intellectuals and establishes the link between a civil state and culture as mutually constitutive in order to revive the state. It argues that culture plays a constitutive role of the rethinking of the social contract in a way that helps to preserve national unity, a civil state and civility. The paper also develops the main cultural features that should be adopted by the state, specifically the intellectual freedom of its individual, institutions and political groups, and openness on respect of diversity within the social fabric.
**Morocco**

In 2011, Morocco witnessed unprecedented popular mobilizations. These mobilizations initiated by the February 20 movement had their impact on the society and societal movements. The paper will examine closely the major transformations within the social and cultural mobilization by studying four movements: the feminist movement, the Amazigh activism, the Islamist movement and finally a number of political parties.