THE MARITIME BOUNDARIES
AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

Legal and Procedural Issues

Version of March 2013
Background

In 2007, Lebanon signed an agreement with Cyprus on the delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). As stipulated by the Law of the Sea, the two southernmost and northern most points of the Lebanese EEZ were left for further negotiations with neighboring countries namely Israel and Syria. The agreement was never ratified by the Lebanese government. On the other hand, Israel marked the Northern point of its EEZ on the western point of Lebanon’s proposed border with Cyprus thus creating a sliver of at least 860 square kilometers in dispute. Israel’s announcement of gas discoveries in the Tamar, Leviathan and Tanin fields has also spurred reactions from Lebanese officials claiming that the gas fields fall within Lebanon’s EEZ.

The recent discourse on over EEZ boundaries and natural resources raised various interpretations of international maritime law, by which countries draw their borders at sea, and created a need to clarify the legal context of maritime boundary conflicts and the practical difficulties that branch out of it.

Introduction

Lebanese Government submits Maritime Borders Map to the UN in July 2010

Southern Border: Based on line 23

Suleiman: Lebanon is determined to defend its territory and rights by all available and legitimate means.

The EEZ has been drawn according to International Law. Lebanon’s maritime borders might also extend further south of point 23.

Map Conflicts with the line agreed upon with Cyprus and conflicts with the line Lebanon itself agreed on with Cyprus where point 1 was used as the southern extremity.

Lebanon: Lebanon is determined to defend its territory and rights by all available and legitimate means.
Methodology and Composition

The legal resource package is based on desk research that relies, to the extent possible, on raw data (primary sources) openly accessible to the public in order to support multiple perspectives and create a neutral basis for interaction. Legal concepts and pertinent legal questions arising from the delimitation of Lebanon’s EEZ are framed in a question/answer style that aims at making specialized legal information accessible to a broader public.

The research was further developed through various consultations with stakeholders in the oil and gas portfolio in Lebanon and passed through a review process by national and international legal experts.

The Resource package consists of five parts. Part I is a glossary for the clarification of technical maritime terms utilized in the maritime field. Part II indicates the international laws and statutes that regulate maritime borders and limits, whereas Part III is a description of the general legal process for delimiting maritime borders and limits. Part IV is an account of the basic facts that shape the legal issues concerning the delimitation of Lebanon’s maritime borders, and of the neighboring countries’ various claims and positions vis-à-vis contiguous maritime boundaries. Part V lays out the peaceful mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution with a brief synopsis on the merits of each mechanism based on case law.

This Resource Package is understood to be a live document, growing with the present developments. Comments on the Legal Resource Package, including suggestions for future packages, are always welcomed. To request copies of the package, provide comments, or make suggestions for new topics, please email the CSI to:
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Disclaimer

The depiction and use of maps, boundaries, geographic names and related data are not warranted to be free of error, nor do they necessarily imply official endorsement by CSI.

Acknowledgement

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1. Key Terms
The following is a general overview of key terms used in maritime law. It aims at clarifying the terminology used in the resource package. The definitions provided below are derived from the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereafter referred to as UNCLOS.

- **Baseline/Coastal Baseline**
  The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State (UNCLOS, art. 5).

- **Nautical Mile**
  A nautical mile (nm) is a unit of length used in sea and air navigation. It was defined in the First International Extraordinary Hydrographic Conference that was held in Monaco in 1929. Nautical miles are measured using the latitude/longitude scale whereby each nautical mile is equivalent to 1,852 km (approximately 6,076 feet).

- **Territorial Sea**
  The Territorial Sea, also known as Territorial Waters, is 12 nm measured from the coastal baseline (UNCLOS, art. 3).

- **Continental Shelf**
  The continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance (UNCLOS, art. 76).

- **Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)**
  The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea but may not extend beyond 200 nm from the territorial sea baselines. (UNCLOS, art. 57). In the EEZ, a State has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, sovereign rights with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds, and jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and structures. (UNCLOS art. 56).

- **Maritime Boundary**
  A Maritime Boundary divides the maritime zones of one state from those of another adjacent or opposite state(s). As such, a bilateral or multilateral agreement among these states is needed to demarcate the boundary.

- **Maritime Limit**
  The Maritime Limit defines the space over which a state can exercise its jurisdiction (see the description of the different maritime zones mentioned above) and is thus established unilaterally by the state. A Maritime Boundary differs from a Maritime Limit as follows:

- **Delimitation**
  Description of the alignment in a treaty or other written source, or by means of a line marked on a map or chart.

- **Demarcation**
  The means by which the described alignment is marked, or evidenced, on the ground by means of cairns of stones, concrete pillars, technical beacons of various kinds, cleared roads, and so on.

- **Seismic Survey**
  Seismic surveys use reflected a sound wave to produce a scan of the Earth’s subsurface. Seismic surveys can help locate ground water, are used to investigate locations for landfills, and characterize how an area will shake during an earthquake, but they are primarily used for oil and gas exploration.

- **High Seas**
  All parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial waters or internal waters of a state (1958 Convention on the High Seas, art. 1).
2. Applicable Conventions and Protocols
International Instruments

- The 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea that include:
  1. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
  2. Convention on the High Seas
  3. Convention on the Continental Shelf
  4. Convention in Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas
  5. Optional Protocol of Signature concerning Settlement of disputes


National Maritime Legislation

- Legislative Decree No 138 concerning territorial waters and sea areas (September 1983)
- Offshore Petroleum Resources Law (August 2010)
- Law No 163 on the Delimitation and Declaration of the Maritime Limits of the Lebanese Republic (August 2011)
3. General Legal Process of Delimiting Maritime Borders and Limits
1. How is a baseline determined?

1.1 Normal Baseline

The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State (UNCLOS, art. 5).

See figure 1, point B.

**Figure 1. Zone of National Jurisdiction 1982 Law of the Sea Convention**

![Figure 1](http://geography.about.com/library/misc/uceez.htm)

1.2 Straight Baseline

If the coastline is deeply indented or cut, or if there are some islands along the coast, a straight line may be drawn across the bays and/or river mouths and islands to form the baseline (UNCLOS, art. 7, 9, 10).

See red line in figure 2.

1.3 Low-Tide Elevations

Naturally formed areas of land which are surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide, may be used as baselines when situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island (UNCLOS, art. 13).

**Figure 2. Coastal Waters: Moreton Bay and Marine Park**

![Figure 2](http://www.derm.qld.gov.au/register/p0224aa.pdf)

2. What are the methods used for the delimitation of maritime borders and limits?

There exist two distinct delimitation methods; the equidistant line method, and the equitable principles method. Tensions developed between these two principles leading to a mixed application of the two methods known as the equitable solution principle.

2.1 Equidistance Line Method

An Equidistance line is one for which every point on the line is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines being used. According to this method, a state’s maritime boundaries should conform to a median line equidistant from the shores of the opposite state.

**Figure 1. Example of equidistance between opposite shores**

![Figure 1](http://www.dokdo-takeshima.com/why-japan-cant-have-dokdo-i.html)

2.2 Equitable Principle

Delimitation based on equidistance may result in inequities particularly in the case of adjacent and opposite states. The equitable principle attempts to remedy this inequity by using other geometrical approaches to delimitation that produce an equal division of areas. For example, in the case of Nicaragua versus Honduras, the ICJ maintained that while equidistance remains the general rule in delimiting the territorial sea, it formed the opinion that it would not be sufficient simply to adjust the provisional equidistant line but that special circumstances required the use of a different method.

**Figure 2. Example of equidistant line between two adjacent states**

![Figure 2](http://www.dokdo-takeshima.com/why-japan-cant-have-dokdo-i.html)
General Legal Process of Delimiting Maritime Borders and Limits

A state with an EEZ that does not intersect with another state’s EEZ proclaims its EEZ following certain procedures (refer to point 5).

States with opposite or adjacent coasts and an EEZ area that intersects among them should reach a bilateral/multilateral agreement on the delimitation of their respective EEZ as per article art. 74 (1) of the UNCLOS that stipulates:

“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”

4. How is the EEZ delimited?

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5. What is the procedure that a country undergoes to proclaim its EEZ?

An EEZ cannot legally come into existence until proclaimed by a state1. The proclamation of the EEZ takes place through:

• Depositing charts and lists of geographical coordinates as designated by cartographers defining the limits of the EEZ at the office of the UN Secretary General- if the state is party to UNCLOS. This data is then published in the UNCLOS Bulletin that is accessible online.

• Provisioning the relevant national legislation.

• With respect to opposite or adjacent states, an agreement between the neighboring states can be concluded at any stage.

3. How is the territorial sea delimited?

The delimitation of the territorial sea is governed by article 15 of the UNCLOS which is identical to the text of the 1958 convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Both conventions provide that unless the states agree otherwise or there are historical titles or special circumstances, states may not extend their territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. “Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.”

2. Combined Method (International Standard)

There are no systematic criteria which should be used to determine an equitable delimitation. As such, the equitable principle remains a rather ambiguous and imprecise rule. This is corroborated by the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the case of the Gulf of Maine and reiterated in the Qatar versus Bahrain case: “In the case of coincident jurisdictional zones, the determination of a single boundary for the different objects of delimitation ‘can only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to one of these… objects to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them’.”

6. What apply if principles should states with opposite or adjacent coasts fail to reach a bilateral agreement

If a bilateral agreement on the EEZ limits cannot be reached, a State can relate to international standard of international law.

Though, the provisions in the treaties that govern maritime delimitation, and the principles and standards that they incorporate, are ambiguous and only provide general guidelines, thus allowing for different interpretations.

Nevertheless, there are certain principles that are set by jurisprudence and are applicable by the ICJ should the states fail to reach a bilateral agreement. These principles state that:

- Delimitation between opposite coasts is characterized as having two end points. With respect to end points, the predominant practice of the Court is to delimit the single maritime boundary, EEZ or continental shelf up to 200 nm or until it reaches a point where the rights of third States may be affected.

- With respect to the point where the rights of third States may be affected, two different approaches are apparent in the jurisprudence of the Court. The first approach is to leave the terminal point of the delimitation open and simply indicate the direction in which the line is to extend until it reaches the point where a third State’s rights are affected. The benefit of this approach is that it ensures that when an agreement is reached with the third State, there will be a completed delimitation in the area and the rights of the third State are not prejudged by the Court.

The second approach is to cut off the line at the limit of claims put forward by third States. A shortcoming of this approach is that it may lead to a situation where the determination of the Court’s jurisdiction is placed in the hands of a third State and depends on that State’s claims.

7. How is the continental shelf delimited?

Article 83 (1) of UNCLOS stipulates: “The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”

Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf stipulates: “Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.”

Therefore, in both conventions, adjacent or opposite states are obliged to reach an agreement on the EEZ and continental shelf limit. Nevertheless, whereas the 1958 Convention incorporates the equidistant-special circumstances principle, the UNCLOS clearly states that the EEZ and continental shelf are delimited based on the equitable principle.
Legal Issues Concerning Lebanon’s EEZ
1. Statement of Facts

Geophysical surveys and explorations for oil and gas started long before the Lebanese civil war and indicated the presence of considerable hydrocarbon resource bases both onshore and offshore. National legislation to regulate maritime borders and resources, however, were limited to the Legislative Decree 138 concerning Territorial Waters and Sea Areas¹ that was passed on 7 September 1983.

The Levantine basin is the underwater geological structure that is located beneath the territorial waters of Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus and Syria. The basin itself has “similar structures and formations” in both Israeli and Lebanese waters which makes “offshore Lebanon even more interesting and more prospective.”²

The following is a relatively recent and chronological account of facts that aims at sharing the knowledge available on the oil and gas portfolio of Lebanon and at drawing a more meaningful view of a series of measures that may seem isolated.

Chronology

• As part of the regional speculative survey conducted over the east Mediterranean region in the year 2000, various 2D and 3D seismic surveys of Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone, hereafter EEZ, were conducted by Spectrum Company. From 2000 to 2007, further seismic surveys were carried out by other companies as well. All seismic data indicate the presence of a considerable hydrocarbon resource offshore Lebanon.

• In 2001, Southampton Oceanographic Center was tasked with delimiting Lebanon’s EEZ.³

• In January 2007, a bilateral agreement was signed between Lebanon and Cyprus in which the edges of the zones were marked by six coordinates judged to be equidistant⁴ between the two countries. Point 1 marked the southern extent between Lebanon and Cyprus and Point 6 marked the northern. Included in the agreement was a clause that left open the possibility of amending Point 1 and 6 in light of future delimitation of the EEZ with other concerned neighboring states, meaning Israel to the south and Syria to the north. The agreement was ratified by Cyprus in 2009 but not by Lebanon in order to maintain diplomatic relations with Turkey who disapproves any agreement that does not include the Turkish-Cypriot part of the island.

• In October 2007, the Lebanese Council of Ministers passed national legislation concerning the petroleum policy for offshore exploration⁵ that was drafted with the assistance of the Norwegian Agency for Development, hereafter NORAD.

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• In October 2007, the Lebanese Council of Ministers passed national legislation concerning the petroleum policy for offshore exploration⁵ that was drafted with the assistance of the Norwegian Agency for Development, hereafter NORAD. The legislation was endorsed by the Parliament in August 2010.

• In April 2009, Lebanese army geographers established the limits of the EEZ along the lines of two points that are shared with Cyprus and Syria; point 1 in the south (shared with Cyprus) and point 6 in the north (shared with Syria). Nevertheless, technically speaking, Lebanon’s outermost EEZ extends beyond these 2 points to include points 23 in the south and point 7 in the north, as claimed by the Lebanese Government.

• In May 2009, the Council of Ministers endorsed the army’s findings and deposited the geographical coordinates defining the Southern limit of Lebanon’s EEZ (bordering Palestine)¹ at office of the UN Secretary General on 15 July, 2010.²

• On 20 October 2010, Lebanon deposited the Southern part of the western median line of its EEZ³ that is the point bordering Cyprus, in addition to the Southern coordinates that it had deposited earlier and that borders Palestine.

• Two months later, on 17 December 2010, Israel signed an agreement with Cyprus delimiting their EEZ zone. The agreement consisted of 12 geographical points defining the edges of the EEZ with the first boundary marker placed on point 1, the same location that marked Lebanon’s Western south common zone with Cyprus as per the Lebanon-Cypriot EEZ agreement. The Israel-Cyprus agreement contained the same clause regarding amending the first and last markers depending on future border agreements with other states.⁴

• On 20 June 2011, the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General clarifying that Lebanon’s EEZ boundary begins at Ras Naqoura which marks the land border between Lebanon and Israel, as per the 1949 Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement table of coordinates, and terminates at Point 23 which lies 133 kilometers from the coast at an average angle of 291 degrees.

The letter ascertained that Point 1 does not represent the southern end of the median line which separates the EEZ of each country and thus it should not be taken as a starting point between Cyprus and Israel.⁵ It also requested the UN to take the needed measures to resolve the problem and ensure Lebanon’s right.

• On 12 July 2011, Israel deposited the geographical coordinates of its northern territorial waters and EEZ designating point 1 as the limit that separates its EEZ from that of Cyprus and Lebanon, and point 31 as the northern limit that separates its territorial sea and EEZ from that of Lebanon.⁶

• Following the letter that Lebanon sent in June 2011, Israel stated that it would demarcate maritime border with direct negotiation with Lebanon and as part of a comprehensive peace agreement.

• On Aug. 4, 2011, the Lebanese Parliament endorsed a law on the delimitation of Lebanon’s EEZ. The relevant decrees are expected to be drafted at a later stage.⁷

• Since August 2011, Israel has deployed unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor its maritime resources, intensifying the tension.⁸


2. Statement by Fawaz Muiad, the Regional Representative of Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS), the company that conducted, along with Spectrum Geo, seismic surveys in Lebanon’s offshore area. Available at http://www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=12033


4. The designation of equidistant coordinates is an application of the median line principle stipulated in the UNCLOS.

1. Letter of the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary General. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDF/files/communications/fmหอม_air_latitude_e.pdf
2. The Paulet-Newcombe agreement was signed between the French and the British on 5 February 1922 and entered into force on 10 March 1923. The agreement delimits the southern border of Lebanon from Ra’s Naqurah at point 1 B, the coordinates of which were officially confirmed on the 1949 map detailing the borders of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine further to the armistice agreements between the concerned parties.3
5. Turkish Conflict and the Revisiting of the Cypriot–Lebanese Agreement.3
7. The 2011 law on the delimitation of Lebanon’s EEZ-Point 31 falls north of Lebanon’s coast and legal issues concerning Lebanon’s EEZ. The EEZ northern boundary begins at point B on the shore at Ra’s Naqurah, the first point on the 1949 Israel–Lebanese General Armistice Agreement table of coordinates, to point 23, that is equidistant between the three countries concerned, on the straight line between points B and 23, coordinates of which all must agree.4
2. Delimitation of Lebanon’s EEZ

As a party to UNCLOS, Lebanon adopted the principles & methods as explained in section III.

2.1 What are Lebanon’s Maritime boundaries and limits?

The EEZ northern boundary begins at point 7 that falls north of AI-Arida river and extends southwards to include point 23 which lies 133 kilometers from the southern coastal area of Ras Naqurah, which marks the land border between Lebanon and Israel, at an average angle of 291 degrees.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adnan Mansour, stated in his official letter submitted to the UN Secretary General on June 20, 2011, "The southern maritime border extends from point B1 on the shore at Ra’s Naqurah, the first point on the 1949 Israel–Lebanese General Armistice Agreement table of coordinates, to point 23, that is equidistant between the three countries concerned, on the straight line between points B and 23, coordinates of which all must agree.5"

Thus, the charts and list of geographical coordinates that Lebanon submitted to the UN are based on the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon as per the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement of 1922 that was reestablished in the Armistice Agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel in 1949.6

Phase 2: Determining the baseline:
The Lebanese army adhered to the normal baseline method, in addition to the straight baseline method in areas such as the bay of Jounieh and the islands facing the northern coast of Lebanon.7

As a result, the equidistant point between the three countries is Lebanon’s lowest possible boundary.8 This implies the possibility of extending Lebanon’s southwest boundary to a point further south to point 23.

2.2 How did Lebanon demarcate its EEZ?

The delimitation process was conducted by the Lebanese Army cartographers and assessed in September 2011 by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) that confirmed the geographic coordinates and charts as drawn by the army.9

The process included several geographic and legal phases as follows:

Phase 1: Determining the coastline:
since it is the reference point for measuring all maritime limits. The coastline includes the mainland and any islands over which the state has sovereignty. This phase has a geographical as well as a legal component whereby bilateral border agreements between neighboring countries are taken into consideration.

Accordingly, Lebanon’s coastline begins at AI Arida north and extends towards Ra’s Naqurah in the south as per the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement of 1922 that was reestablished in the Armistice Agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel in 1949.10

Phase 2: Determining the baseline:
The Lebanese army adhered to the normal baseline method, in addition to the straight and baseline method in areas such as the bay of Jounieh and the islands facing the northern coast of Lebanon.11
Phase 3: Applying the equidistant method.

When drawing the median line between Lebanon and Cyprus according to the equidistant method (refer to section 2.1), it is not clear whether the Lebanese army relied on the straight baseline of Cyprus to calculate the mid area between Lebanon and Cyprus, or on the base points that Cyprus has declared to the UN according to the UNCLOS bulletin. This information has not been made available to the public and is thus beyond the scope of this research.

Phase 4: Reaching agreements with opposite and adjacent states.

In January 2007, a bilateral agreement was signed between Lebanon and Cyprus - never ratified by Lebanon but ratified by Cyprus in 2009 (refer to section 3.3). No negotiations took place between Lebanon and Israel given the state of enmity. Lebanon had sent several letters to Syrian counterparts, but no formal negotiations followed.

2.3 Is the maritime agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus valid?

In January 2007, a bilateral agreement was signed between Lebanon and Cyprus - never ratified by Lebanon but ratified by Cyprus in 2009 - in which the edges of the zones were marked by six coordinates judged to be equidistant between the two countries. Included in the agreement was a clause that left open the possibility of amending Point 1 and 6 in light of future delimitation of the EEZ with other concerned neighboring states, meaning Israel to the south and Syria to the north.

The agreement was not ratified by Lebanon in order to maintain diplomatic relation with Turkey, who disputes any agreement that does not include the Turkish-Cypriot part of the island. By signing the agreement, Lebanon has demonstrated its intention of examining it domestically. Nevertheless, the fact that Lebanon did not ratify the agreement entails that it is not legally binding to Lebanon.

2.4 What are the legal flaws in the Lebanese - Cypriot agreement of 2007?

Legal experts maintain that by following the equidistance method or median line method, Lebanon has lost some of its EEZ areas in the North and South, and that a combination of the Equidistance and Equitable principle would have been more in line with international jurisprudence.

Also, when designating the EEZ borders with Cyprus, Lebanon mentioned point 1 as its initial west southern border point with Cyprus. In fact, point 1 is around 10 miles away from point 23. This retreat happened with the view that the adjacent area that includes point 23 is the equidistant point between Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel, and thus should be subject to agreements with the relevant parties as per article 74 (1) of the UNCLOS. Nevertheless, the provisions of that agreement did not ascertain that these 10 miles - that is point 23 in the south and 7 in the North - are Lebanese.

On July 11, 2011, Cyprus’ Ambassador handed an official memorandum to the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs that assures the cooperation of Cyprus with Lebanon to conclude all the unresolved issues and guarantee Lebanon’s rights. Nevertheless, in March 2012, the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that Cyprus is bound by both the Lebanese and the Israeli agreements and that it is not responsible for the correction of any mistake that was committed by the Lebanese. Cyprus reiterated that it will not amend the EEZ agreement except following a tripartite agreement that includes Israel.

Lebanese Parliament Speaker, Berri, had visited Cyprus earlier in March 2012 and assured that Lebanon can ratify the EEZ agreement with Cyprus shortly once the dispute with Israel over the southern maritime border of Lebanon is resolved.

2.5 How does an agreement between Cyprus and Israel impact on the maritime boundaries of Lebanon?

Israel has the position that the EEZ boundary begins from Ra’i’s Naquara (albeit 35 meters north of Lebanon’s starting point) and stretches 127 kilometers at 298 degrees to terminate at Point 1, which lies 17 kilometers north east of Lebanon’s Point 23.

In December 2010, two months after Lebanon submitted its southern maritime boundary proposal to the UN, Israel signed an agreement with Cyprus on their own EEZ. The agreement consisted of 12 geographical points defining the edges of their EEZ. The first boundary marker in the agreement was placed in exactly the same location as point 1 in the Lebanon - Cyprus EEZ agreement.

As such, Israel’s EEZ delimitation has infringed on Lebanon’s economic zone, consisting of at least 854 square kilometers stretching between Lebanon’s point 23 and point 1.

Even though the agreement between Israel and Cyprus is not binding towards Lebanon, it defies the object and purpose of Cyprus’s prior agreement with Lebanon before its entry into force. This is a violation of article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force.

Nevertheless, article 1 (e) of the agreement between Cyprus and Israel stipulates: “Taking into consideration the principles of customary international law relating to the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between States, the geographical coordinates of points 1 or 12 could be reviewed and/or modified as necessary in light of a future agreement regarding the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone to be reached by the three States concerned with respect to each of the said points.”

References

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint statement of Lebanon and Cyprus on the delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zone, 1949
2. Lebanon - Cyprus EEZ agreement.
2.6 Is it relevant that Israel did not sign UNCLOS?

Israel is party to the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea and is bound by its provisions. The 1958 Conventions did not put forward the concept of the EEZ, but provided that coastal states were entitled to special rights in coastal areas such as the continental shelf. (refer to section III - point 7. How is the continental shelf delimited.)

Israel is not party to the UNCLOS and as such is not bound by its provisions. However, maritime issues depend on a variety of sources of international law which includes customary international law. Certain aspects of the UNCLOS have become accepted as customary international law since there has been a consensus on their applicability.

This has been the position of the ICJ in the case concerning the continental shelf between Libya and Malta, whereby the full bench of the ICJ took careful account of certain aspects of the UNCLOS as evidence of customary international law. Also, in the same case, the ICJ held that:

"It is incontestable that...the EEZ is shown to exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, it is an inherent right." 1

The court had thus found that the rules that govern the EEZ are rooted in state practice and customary international law in 1985 - that is, even before the UNCLOS entered into force in 1994. Based on the above, Israel is bound by maritime customary international law that is influenced by certain provisions of the UNCLOS.

2.7 What is the extension of Lebanon’s continental shelf?

According to geologists, Lebanon’s continental shelf is very narrow with a width of 10 km that drops down abruptly to water depths of 1500m.2

Lebanon’s right over its continental shelf is ipso jure - that is, Lebanon has an inherent right over its continental shelf that does not need to be proclaimed in order to come into existence. This is stipulated in article 77 (3) of the UNCLOS:

"The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express proclamation.”

Also, in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ held that:

"the rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, it is an inherent right.”

The Lebanese law number 163 concerning the delimitation and proclamation of the Lebanese sector of the continental shelf and the rights that the State is entitled to, in the area of continental shelf that does not exceed a width of 10 nautical miles from the coast, was enacted on 23/3/2012. The law stipulates that the Lebanese continental shelf is the area of 850 square km.3

A US survey that was published in 2009 indicated the presence of around 1.22 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.7 billion cubic meters of oil in an area off the coast of Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Cyprus and Syria known as the Levantine basin.4 The Israels were quick to announce its gas discoveries stirring a series of reactions from Lebanon and other neighboring countries. The tension is already high on oil and gas fields with a potential for future conflict. This section maps the claims of the count conflict and options available to prevent or resolve them.

3. Conflicting Claims


2. Official Letter submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adnan Mansour, to the UN Secretary-General on June 20, 2011.


8. يتجاوز سلبر بير وغي…it is stipulated in article 77 (3) of the UNCLOS: http://www.annahar.com/articles/11/03/24662


A US survey that was published in 2009 indicated the presence of around 1.22 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.7 billion cubic meters of oil in an area off the coast of Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Cyprus and Syria known as the Levantine basin. The Israels were quick to announce its gas discoveries stirring a series of reactions from Lebanon and other neighboring countries. The tension is already high on oil and gas fields with a potential for future conflict. This section maps the claims of the count conflict and options available to prevent or resolve them.

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3.1 Position Mapping of Countries Claiming Maritime Rights

3.1.1 Positions on Lebanon’s South and Southern West Borders

Lebanon:

• Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mansour, in a letter to the UN (14/7/2011): “Lebanon objects to the agreement between Cyprus and Israel in which they delimited their respective EEZ because it affects points falling north of the line constituting the southern border of the EEZ of Lebanon. Lebanon requests that the Secretary-general of the UN take all measures that he deems appropriate, with a view to avoiding conflict and safeguarding international peace and security.”

• Lebanese Diplomatic Sources (11/11/2011) state that ongoing negotiations with Cyprus are complex as Cyprus insists that Lebanon ratifies the agreement of February 2007 before correcting the geographical coordinates of Lebanon’s EEZ as stipulated in the agreement.

Cyprus:

• Cyprus Ambassador hands an official memorandum (11/7/2011) to Lebanon Minister of Foreign Affairs that assures the cooperation of Cyprus with Lebanon to conclude all the unresolved issues and guarantee Lebanon’s rights. 4

• Cypriot foreign minister (25/11/2011): “We are committed to intensify our work in order to extend our cooperation in every area.”

• Cypriot President, Christofias (29/02/2012) tells Lebanese Parliament Speaker that Cyprus does not mind revising its EEZ agreement with Israel and assures him that Cyprus’s good relations with Israel will not be at Lebanon’s expense.

• Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (March 2012) declares that her country is not responsible for the flaws in the EEZ agreements and that it will not amend these agreements except based on a tripartite agreement among Lebanon Cyprus and Israel. 5
Israel:

- Prime Minister, Netanyahu, states (7/7/2011) that the maritime borders declared by Lebanon are further south than those determined in previous deals and encroach upon Israel territory.1

- Following the letter that Lebanon sent in June 2011, Israel states it would demarcate maritime border with direct negotiation with Lebanon and as part of a comprehensive peace agreement.2

- The Israeli military requested Lebanon to enforce security measures along its southern maritime border, however, the Lebanese military refused to take any such measures before a proper demarcation that starts off from Naqoura. UNIFIL is assuming bilateral negotiations with both sides to demarcate Lebanon’s southern maritime border.3

Turkey:

- In January 2007, Turkey called on Lebanon and Egypt to put on hold agreements with Cyprus, saying the agreement infringed on the rights of the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state on the divided island.4

- In December 2010, Turkey objected the agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus on the basis that it disregards the rights and jurisdiction of Turkish Cypriots on the island.5

United Nations:

- In its reply to the request of Lebanon’s Foreign Minister to exert every possible effort to deter Israel, U.N. spokesperson Martin Nesirky said (4/1/2011): “The mandate [of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701] is very specific on what UNIFIL does including its maritime component, and it is also fairly specific that it does not include delineating lines - maritime lines”.7

Nevertheless, the UN Special coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams (10/1/2011) states that the country was entitled to benefit from its national energy resources, and that the UN would help the country mark its maritime border with Israel.8

March 2012: UNIFIL is currently communicating with the Israeli and Lebanese counterparts to reach an agreement concerning Lebanon’s southern maritime border.9

Syria:

- In June 2010, President Assad and President Suleiman discuss joint land and sea borderlines and agree to direct committees to complete the gathering of information and data by every side in prelude for initiating the process of defining and demarcation of these borders as soon as possible.2

- No progress has been noted since the outbreak of violence in Syria.


8. Beri meets Williams, Warns of Dangers if Lebanon’s Oil Resources are exploited, The Daily Middle East Reporter, 10 January 2011.

Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Mechanisms for Settlement of Lebanon’s Maritime Disputes
1. General Legal Options

1.1 What are the legal instruments that determine the general mechanisms of resolving disputes among states?

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”

Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes emphasizes several consent-based procedures to resolve disputes among states. These include: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice1.

Article 35 of Chapter VI makes it possible for States to bring their dispute to the attention of the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council if their dispute is likely to threaten international peace and security. Should the Security Council deem the dispute a threat to international peace, it shall recommend appropriate procedures for dispute settlement taking into consideration any settlement procedures already adopted by the parties and taking into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be settled by peaceful means of their own choice1.

1.1 What dispute settlement options does the maritime conventions (UNCLOS and 1958 Maritime Conventions) provide?

a) UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Options

UNCLOS includes two types of dispute settlement mechanisms: mechanisms entailing non-binding decisions, and mechanisms entailing binding decisions. Mechanisms that entail non-binding decisions include:

- **Negotiations:** Article 74(1) of UNCLOS stipulates that the delimitation of a maritime boundary has to be “effected by agreement on the basis of international law.”

- **Exchange of views:** Article 283 of the UNCLOS provisioned that parties exchange views expeditiously regarding the mode of settling their maritime disputes by negotiations or any other peaceful method.

- **Good Offices:** Involves the use of a third party - a state, a group of states, an international organization or an eminent individual - to encourage the disputing parties to resolve their dispute and come to a settlement. Good Offices end when negotiations among the parties begin and the good officer does not participate in the negotiations.

b) 1958 Maritime Conventions Dispute Settlement Options

The four maritime conventions pass disputes to the Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which provides that disputes arising from the interpretation of the four conventions may be brought unilaterally before the International Court of Justice, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.

1. Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, articles I & IV.
1.3 Are the above mentioned mechanisms mandatory or optional?

Dispute settlement mechanisms listed under chapter XV of the UNCLOS are mandatory. According to article 299 of the UNCLOS, parties to a dispute may agree at any time to any dispute settlement method of their choice.

Nevertheless, parties may make a declaration of exclusion that allows for withdrawal from the compulsory procedures when it relates to maritime boundary disputes, particularly related to the delimitation of the continental shelf, the EEZ and the territorial sea among opposite or adjacent states. To be exempt from the compulsory procedure, however, the state party should make the declaration of exclusion before the Convention enters into force. States making such reservations will be required to agree on a conciliation procedure. 1

Lebanon has not declared any reservations to UNCLOS and is hence bound by the dispute settlement mechanisms set under UNCLOS. Israel is not party to the UNCLOS, however, decisions of the ICJ have established certain aspects of UNCLOS as evidence of customary international law. 2 As such, Israel is bound by aspects of the UNCLOS that are considered to be part of customary international law.

1.4 What are provisional options to settle the boundary dispute?

One option is a provisional arrangement. It is a temporary practical arrangement that is agreed upon pending final delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf.

In principle, once a boundary is determined, it is meant to be permanent. However, on exceptional basis, states may establish temporary boundaries possibly in order to consider issues that may arise with other neighboring countries and that warrant further negotiations. For example, Tunisia and Algeria established a delimitation for only six years. 3

Though, once these arrangements expire, a dispute may arise over the same issues that were subject to a temporary agreement.

Another option is a joint development agreement. Joint development agreements are co-operative arrangements between states with overlapping EEZ or continental shelf to bring the common zones under a joint regime that allows for the exploitation of resources by the parties.

There are different types of joint development agreements. Sometimes one state runs the oil and gas operations in the area under its law and simply pays an agreed proportion of the net revenues to its partner, as is the case in the Bahrain-Saudi agreement. More usually, both States will be actively involved either directly or through a management Commission with legal personality that holds licensing rounds. This will especially be the case if the joint development arrangement is made after the agreement on a boundary, but before an oil or gas discover is made. Some joint development zones operate by means of joint ventures between companies from the two parties.

The key features of areas for a joint development agreement are as follows:

- A treaty creating and defining the extent of the area. This is often but not always the area of the overlaps.

- A “without prejudice” clause, making clear that the arrangement is interim or provisional pending a final delimitation of the boundaries.

- Long duration (45 years in Nigeria/Sao Tome, with review after 30), because oil industry needs a long time span. The boundary can be agreed upon by negotiations during that time or at the end of the agreement.

- A system for exploitation and an agreed division of the production revenue (not always 50/50).


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2. Lebanon Specific Options

Designing a dispute settlement process for Lebanon first requires recognizing the complex political, economic and social questions that may fall beyond the scope of law. As such, a more nuanced process based on parallel long-term and short-term settlement mechanisms that are mutually reinforcing, is more likely to ensure that Lebanon’s strategic and economic interests are not compromised.

2.1 What mechanisms of International Dispute resolution can Lebanon consider to resolve EEZ issues with Cyprus?

The UNCLOS obliges states to reach an agreement on disputed maritime areas\(^1\). As such, negotiations is the primary mechanism to resolve issues related to overlapping claims on maritime boundaries.

Indeed negotiations between Cyprus and Lebanon are still ongoing. The Cypriot government has not denied Lebanon’s rights to the alleged disputed area. In fact, Cyprus is keen on developing strategic relations with its neighboring countries, as has been reiterated on various occasions by its officials\(^2\). These strategic relations were translated into cooperation agreements with Israel and a series of agreements that it intends to conclude with Lebanon. In this spirit of cooperation and in its efforts to conclude various strategic deals with Lebanon, Cyprus and Lebanon may be able to conclude a package of agreements that includes maritime borders.

Cyprus’s intention to resolve maritime boundary issues with Lebanon without jeopardizing its strategic gas interests with Israel may put Cyprus in a mediation role that can speed up the resolving of Lebanon’s southern maritime boundary. Should diplomacy and negotiations fail to achieve an amended agreement with Cyprus, both states may resort to arbitration as stipulated in the Cypriot-Lebanese Agreement itself. It is worthy to mention that arbitration is more flexible than adjudication by the ICJ since it is a simplified version of a court where the parties may choose the applicable procedures and laws, and reach a binding decision.

Nevertheless, the arbitration approach has been criticized for its limited results. For example, in the Abiyei Arbitration case between the Sudanese government and the People’s Liberation Army of Sudan over the territorial boundary demarcation, oil, water and grazing rights, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) divided the territory between the two parties by issuing new boundaries, and demarcated the oil fields to the territory belonging to the North. The underlying issues pertaining to oil, water and grazing rights remain unresolved, and the parties now bear the responsibility for pursuing resolutions to these issues through other means of unspecified nature and timing. This failure to address outstanding issues and promote reconciliation was among the critiques expressed by one judge’s dissenting opinion\(^3\).

1. UNCLOS, article 74: “The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution”.

2. Examples of successful integrated settlement methods include the Cameroon-Nigeria case\(^1\) in 1961 and 1981, border disputes between the Cameroon and Nigeria resulted in armed conflict. Fighting continued in 1994 intermittently until 2000 when leaders from both countries agreed to pursue judicial settlement at the ICI. In October 2002, the ICI decided that Cameroon had sovereignty over parts of the disputed area. A commission composed of representatives from both countries and the USA was established to facilitate implementation of the court decision - that is, to oversee Nigeria’s release of 32 villages to Cameroon with UN Secretary General, Anan, supporting the peace process. As such, the combination of adjudication by the International Court of Justice, facilitation by a commission that included representatives from the two States in addition to the USA, and the political support of the UN led to the resolution of the resource dispute and the armed conflict.

The Buraymi Oasis sovereignty and resources dispute between Saudi Arabia and Oman serves as another case study whereby adjudication was not employed, but rather an integrated approach that included mediation and facilitation\(^5\). Oman had begun oil exploration in the 1940s in an undemarcated border area that Saudi Arabia later claimed sovereignty over. Negotiations between the 2 governments stretched from 1942 to 1952 only to end in armed aggression by both sides. An arbitration attempt failed in 1954-55 despite pressure from the Arab League. In 1959, the UN Secretary General engaged the parties in mediation which paved the way to direct negotiations between the parties until a settlement agreement was reached in 1975 granting Oman sovereignty over the area while apportioning land with potential oil reserves and sea access to Saudi Arabia.\(^5\)

3. Ibid. p. 382

4. Ibid. p. 382

2.2 What mechanisms can Lebanon consider to resolve EEZ issue with Israel?

After correcting the technical and legal errors in its agreement with Cyprus, signing and ratifying a new agreement, Lebanon may request that Cyprus amends its agreement with Israel accordingly. If this option proves to be successful, Israel could then acknowledge Lebanon’s southern west border through the agreement with Cyprus.

Meanwhile, certain preventive mechanisms can be taken to avoid engaging in a maritime conflict. These measures may include:

- An agreement with the oil company operating on Israeli maritime boundary to abstain from horizontal drilling that would lead to the usurping of Lebanon’s oil and gas.
- A request to the UN to monitor the disputed zone in order to prevent breaching of Lebanon’s right to its oil and gas. A mechanism that is similar to the UN’s monitoring role on Lebanon’s southern territorial border.

Notwithstanding the above mentioned options, an array of procedures can be pursued to further ascertain Lebanon’s rights:

2.2.1 Resort to UN mediation

Israel’s linking of the maritime boundary conflict to a comprehensive peace agreement may be interpreted as a politicization of the conflict that aims at engaging Lebanon in direct negotiations that address the bigger issue of peace in the region. However, Lebanon has reiterated on various occasions that direct negotiations is impossible in light of the enmities and that peace in the region has various Palestinian and non-Palestinian constituents. Nevertheless, for purposes of reaching an agreement with Israel on the limits of the EEZ, the current ongoing UN mediation serves as an option to overcome the relationship conflict for the purpose of reaching such an agreement.

2.2.2 Protest at UN Security Council

Lebanon has already protested that Israel’s declared EEZ infringes on its southern and west southern EEZ limit.

Lebanon could request that the Security Council issues a resolution acknowledging this infringement and calling upon Israel to rectify its northern EEZ limit accordingly.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that relying solely on a Security Council resolution has limited efficiency, if the UN Security Council does not enforce its position vis-à-vis any contradicting claims. Nevertheless, it is important to note that relying solely on a Security Council resolution has limited efficiency, if the UN Security Council does not enforce its position on Israel. (see below Precedents concerning resolution through the UN Security Council).

However, a UN resolution could serve as a basis for an agreement between Lebanon and Israel.

On November 16, 1948, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 62 on “The Palestine Question” calling all parties directly involved in the Palestine conflict - including Lebanon - to seek an agreement, either directly or through an acting mediator, to demarcate lines beyond which armed forces shall not move. The negotiations were held in Rhodes under the aegis of the UN mediator Ralph Bunche and resulted in the border and armistice agreements with Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. The agreement reiterated that it was a truce agreement that acknowledged territorial borders and not a peace agreement with Israel. The agreement was supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission that reported a continuous breaching of the agreement.

Lebanon could follow the same mechanism, by requesting a UN Security Council resolution followed by a similar negotiation procedure to conclude an agreement with Israel.

There have been various precedents concerning resolution through the UN Security Council concerning Lebanon-Israel:

- Resolution 425 (1978) on the Immediate Cessation of Israeli Military Action against Lebanon and withdrawal of its forces from all Lebanese territory. This was followed by resolution 426 (1978) on the Establishment of the UN Interim Forces for an initial period of 6 months. Israel did not withdraw totally as per the resolution.


- More than 200 resolutions concerning Israel and its neighboring states have been issued by the UN Security Council; however, most have not been fully implemented.

2.2.3 Protest at UN General Assembly

Lebanon may resort to the UN General Assembly for a resolution in this respect. This resolution will not be binding and acts as an acknowledgement of Lebanon’s rights only.

The UN General Assembly has already issued five resolutions concerning Oil slick on Lebanese shores following the 2006 wars. Israel has not complied with any of the compensation obligations established by these resolutions.

2.2.4 Advisory opinion from the ICI

Lebanon may seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice concerning the limits of its southern EEZ boundary. This procedure is initiated unilaterally and does not require Israel’s acceptance of the ICI’s jurisdiction.

An advisory opinion is not binding, but combined with other settlement mechanisms can serve as a valid declaration of Lebanon’s rights that strengthens its position vis-à-vis any contradicting claims.


2. UN Charter, article 35.


5. ICJ Statute, article 36.
2.2.5 Litigation

The ICJ is mandated to adjudicate legal questions related to various issues including: (a) sovereignty over certain territories and frontier disputes; (b) those concerning maritime delimitations and other law of the sea disputes; (c) cases involving enforcement of contracts and violation of certain principles of customary international law. 1 A judicial settlement through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is not only binding as arbitration, but also final and without appeal. 2

Lebanon and Israel are parties to the ICJ, however, settlement by the ICJ is subject to the recognition by the both parties concerned of the jurisdiction of the courts. The recognition may be explicitly expressed by way of a special agreement between the States parties to a dispute (comprisium) that confers jurisdiction over the maritime boundary to the ICJ, or implicitly inferred if the respondent state does not object to the jurisdiction of the Court thus indicating its tacit approval to settlement by the ICJ. 3

The Israeli government submitted to the UN Secretary General its consent regarding the jurisdiction of the ICJ in 1950 for a period of five years that was renewed in 1956. However, in anticipation of litigation against it, Israel terminated its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in 1983. 4

Lebanon has not submitted a statement of consent on the ICJ’s jurisdiction. With respect to filing a law suit against Israel at the ICJ, there exists two different opinions in this respect; One particular opinion of a Lebanese jurist, Edmond Naim, claims that suing the Israeli government is an acknowledgement of its statehood. 5

“Whether we are at war with Israel in the legal sense of Public International Law or not, Lebanon has not to date recognized Israel as per International law methodology. As such, if we sue Israel at the International Court of Justice and Israel accepted this prosecution, this would result in the recognition by the Lebanese State of the statehood of Israel.” 6

Other experts claim that it is possible to sue the Israeli government at the ICJ without acknowledging its statehood because:

• The act of acknowledging statehood is a sovereign prerogative that a state decides unilaterally and carries out by a clear declaration. 7

• Even though Israel is a member of the UN, this membership is binding towards Lebanon but it does not ensure any acknowledgement by Lebanon of Israel’s statehood. Similarly, the ICJ is the main judicial body of the UN (article 92 of the UN charter), and Israel’s membership in this body does not ensure any acknowledgement by Lebanon of its statehood. 8

The ICJ is mandated to resolve conflicts of legal nature, in this case regarding the geographical maritime boundaries, irrespective of a state’s position. Its mandate is thus linked to the legal conflict aspect of the relationship between the countries and not the issue of statehood. 9

There have been various precedents concerning attempts by Lebanon to sue Israel at the ICJ:

• In 1996, following Qana massacre, the Ministry of Justice prepared a report concerning the legal basis for Israeli liability and the competent adjudicating authority. 10 However, the report was not given full effect.

• In 2006, the Council of Ministers authorized the Ministry of Justice to prepare a report on the mechanisms and procedures to the sue Israel. 11 The report was carried out with the help of national and international experts, and presented a legal argument on the possibility of adjudication without acknowledging Israel’s statehood. The legal analysis has not found consensus among other legal experts. 12

2.2 Can Lebanon sue Israel for compensation if oil or gas was extracted from the territory of Lebanon?

Precedent concerning compensation resolution by the UN Security Council:

Resolution 262 (1968) called upon Israel to pay compensation to Lebanon for the destruction of airliners at the Beirut international airport. 13 The Resolution has not been implemented by Israel. Precedent concerning Compensation Commission:

• Upon the recommendation of the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council issued resolution no 687 (1991) that set up a Compensation Commission in 1991 to provide Kuwait with compensation for damages caused by the Iraqi invasion. 14

• In 2008, the UN General Assembly decided in resolution 63/211 asking Israel to compensate Lebanon on environmental damages caused by the oil spilled from Jiyyeh station during the 2006 war, and to establish the Eastern Mediterranean Oil Spill Restoration Trust Fund to provide assistance to countries affected. Contribution to this fund is voluntary. 15 Israel has not compiled with this resolution and the UN Security Council has not taken any measures to force Israel to comply with the resolution.

• Another complementary fund, known as the Lebanon Recovery Fund, was established upon the request of the Lebanese government. It enables donors to pool their resources and rapidly provide funding in the aftermath of the July 2006 war. As stated in its Terms of Reference, will finance priority recovery and reconstruction projects that are approved by the Government and that can be executed with the support of Participating UN Organizations within the scope and time frame of national priorities. 16

Both funds have been integrated, but have not received sufficient donations to continue the necessary long term studies and cleaning of oil slick projects 17.
2.3 What are the ramifications of the US proposed solution?

The US, through its mediator Fredrick Hof, declared that it is convinced that 500 km\(^2\) of the disputed maritime area with Israel belongs to Lebanon and proposed that Lebanon begins exploring within this area pending a final agreement on the remaining 360 km\(^2\) disputed area.

Neither Lebanon nor Israel formally replied to the US proposal, however, this proposal has created an internal debate in Lebanon between those who support this solution as a “pragmatic option” with the view of continuing UN and US diplomatic endeavors to restore Lebanon’s whole rights over the whole disputed area, and those who refuse the US proposal and assert Lebanon’s right over the whole disputed area since the delimitation of maritime boundaries was conducted in accordance with international standards and methods.

This debate raises a number of issues:

- Lebanon’s right in the exclusive economic zone that it determined based on international law, and its right to exploit its natural resources within this zone is a sovereign indivisible right that is not subject to bargaining.

This was in fact the position of Norway, for instance, which held to its sovereign right over its entire economic zone in its negotiations with Russia on its maritime borders in the Barents Sea and the Atlantic. Based on this right, Norway rejected any “temporary measures” in the disputed zone - except for those measures related to protecting fisheries.

- the principle of the integrity of land ascertains Lebanon’s full sovereignty over its entire territory. Similarly, the principle of integrity of Lebanese territory should extend to Lebanon’s maritime zones, and dividing the Lebanese EEZ undermines this integrity.

- Lebanon’s current position is that of no dispute exists with Israel, because the 860 km\(^2\) zone is Lebanese according to the demarcation process conducted by the Lebanese army. Negotiations with Israel aim only to establish the geodata submitted by Lebanon to the UN, which are in contradiction with the data submitted by Israel to the UN, and those agreed upon between Israel and Cyprus in the Maritime Boundary Agreement between the two countries. Consequently, Lebanon has not yet lost any inch of this zone.

Accepting the 500 km\(^2\) zone means starting a conflict with Israel on the remaining zone, that is, Israel will claim that it is an Israeli zone. Consequently, Lebanon’s negotiating position will transform into a defensive one.

- If the US and the UN are convinced that the entire 860 km\(^2\) zone is Lebanese, why defer diplomatic pressure for the recognition of the whole disputed area to a later stage? Also, are there any guarantees that future endeavors shall succeed in recognition of the whole disputed area as Lebanese and the amendment of the Israeli-Cypriot EEZ agreement accordingly?

- Lebanese Minister of Energy, Gibran Bassil, revealed that the quantity of gas available at the edge of the disputed area with Israel (around 12 thousand billion cubic feet) is only a sample of the resource quantities that Lebanon possesses, noting that even larger quantities exist in the north, middle and south. Based on this information, a pragmatic approach may lie in investing in non-disputed areas rich in resources instead of jeopardizing sovereignty rights over the south western EEZ area.

- Assuming theoretically that the US proposal is in fact a solution, how viable is this solution? Who would control the remaining 360 km\(^2\)? Will another blue line be drawn in the sea and put under UN supervision? What guarantees Israel’s abstinence from undertaking any activities that jeopardize the region’s resources?

Even if Israel claims that this area will be a neutral zone and that it would not conduct any activity there, Israel has a history full of violations of the Lebanese sovereignty and borders. Would then guarantees by the UN and the US be enough to ward off similar attacks in the sea?
Annex 1- Lebanon geographics coordinates and letters addressed to the UN

Addendum to Lebanon Geographic Coordinates Deposited in 2010 - Southern Borders

Report concerning the delimitation of the southern limit of Lebanon’s exclusive economic zone

In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), to which Lebanon acceded by virtue of Law No. 203 of 25 February 1994, and in pursuance of the following article on the delimitation of exclusive economic zones, the text of which is contained in Annex 1, the Government of Lebanon hereby announces the following:

- Article 5 concerning the normal baseline.
- Article 7 concerning island boundaries.
- Article 54 concerning the combination of methods for determining boundaries.
- Article 55 concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.
- Article 36 concerning charts and lists of cartographic coordinates.
- Article 55 concerning the specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zones.
- Article 56 concerning the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone.
- Article 57 concerning the breadth of the exclusive economic zone.
- Article 58 concerning the rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone.
- Article 59 concerning the bases for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone.
- Article 60 concerning artificial islands, structures and activities in the exclusive economic zone.
- Article 63 concerning states occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States on both the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it.
- Article 73 concerning the enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State.
- Article 74 concerning the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.

In accordance with the provisions of the Berlin Protocol of 2 February 1922, which entered into force on 30 March 1923, delimiting the southern border of Lebanon from Egypt’s Nagaria at point 10, the coordinates of which were officially confirmed in the 1949 map describing the borders of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, the Government of Lebanon adheres to the convention agreements between the concerned parties.

### List of Geographical Coordinates for the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone in WGS84

The following tables contain position information for the Median Line between Lebanon and Cyprus.

**Western Median Line (Lebanon - Cyprus)**

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<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Northern Median Line (Lebanon - Syria)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Degrees</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
<th>Seconds</th>
<th>Seconds</th>
<th>Degrees</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
<th>Seconds</th>
<th>Seconds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43.88</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>43.88</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43.88</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43.88</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13.80</td>
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<td>43.88</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>13.80</td>
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<td>43.88</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43.88</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Annexes**

Lebanon Geographic Coordinates Deposited in 2011 - South-West-North Borders

Lebanon Letter to UN - July 2011

Lebanon Geographic Coordinates for the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone in WGS84

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**Lebanon Letter to UN - July 2011**

I write to you with regard to the exclusive economic zone of Lebanon. On 9th July 2011 and 10th October 2011, Lebanon deposited with the United Nations the geographical coordinates of, respectively, the southern and northeastern maritime borders of the zone. This submission is made in accordance with paragraph 12 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Subsequent to the submission of the coordinates for Lebanon, the other Governments of the Parties to the Convention have also deposited the coordinates of their respective exclusive economic zones. The集体经济 of Lebanon has been established by the United Nations, and Lebanon has also been invited to deposit the coordinates of its exclusive economic zone. I am pleased to inform you that Lebanon has also deposited the coordinates of its exclusive economic zone with the United Nations, and these coordinates have been examined and accepted by the United Nations.

I understand from your letter that you are preparing a report on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones of the Parties to the Convention. I would appreciate it if you could take into account the fact that Lebanon has already deposited the coordinates of its exclusive economic zone. I would also appreciate it if you could provide information on the progress of the delimitation process and the steps taken by the United Nations towards the acceptance of the coordinates of Lebanon’s exclusive economic zone.

Yours faithfully,

[Name]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

[Signature]
Annex 2 - EEZ Agreements in the Mediterranean

EGY-CYP EEZ Agreement

The Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt have signed an Agreement concerning the boundaries on the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone, on 17 February 2003. The Agreement is based on the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). It covers the delimitation of the EEZ boundaries and the Continental Shelf.

ISR-JOR Maritime Boundary Agreement

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have signed a Maritime Boundary Agreement on 18 January 2006. The Agreement defines the maritime boundary between the two countries, setting out the boundaries on the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone.
ISR-CYP EEZ Agreement

Article 1

The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the two Parties is affected by the median line, as such term is defined in paragraph (b) below.

(b) The median line between the two Parties and its limits are defined by points 1 and 12, in accordance with the list of geographical coordinates attached hereto as Annex I, which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 3

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1(a), if either of the two Parties is engaged in negotiations aimed at the delimitation of its Exclusive Economic Zone with another state, that Party, before reaching final agreement with the other State, shall notify and consult the other Party, if such delimitation is in connection with coordinates 1 or 12.

Article 4

(a) Any dispute arising from the drafting or implementation of this Agreement shall be settled through diplomatic channels in a spirit of understanding and cooperation.

(b) If in the event that the two Parties do not settle the dispute within a reasonable period of time through diplomatic channels in accordance with paragraph (a) above, the dispute will be referred to arbitration. The terms of reference and the procedure of the arbitration shall be determined by the Parties, by mutual agreement, prior to the commencement of the arbitration.

Article 5

This Agreement is subject to ratification according to the constitutional procedures in each country.

Annex I

List of geographical coordinates of points 1 to 12 on the median line between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POINT</th>
<th>LATITUDE</th>
<th>LONGITUDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>35°10’N</td>
<td>34°15’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>35°15’N</td>
<td>34°10’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>35°20’N</td>
<td>33°55’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>35°25’N</td>
<td>33°50’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>35°30’N</td>
<td>33°45’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>35°35’N</td>
<td>33°40’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>35°40’N</td>
<td>33°35’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>35°45’N</td>
<td>33°30’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>35°50’N</td>
<td>33°25’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>35°55’N</td>
<td>33°20’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>36°00’N</td>
<td>33°15’E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>36°05’N</td>
<td>33°10’E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The geographical coordinates of points 1 and 12 could be reviewed and/or modified as necessary in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

Note: The median line is determined, appears graphically on the Official Hydrographic Chart published by the British Admiralty No. 100 (Paris to Alexandria), scale 1:117,000,000. (Attached hereto as Annex I, which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement).
Annex 3- Lebanese Legislation Concerning Maritime Boundries

Decree 138- LEB Territorial Sea

Legislative Decree No. 138 concerning territorial waters and sea areas, of 7 September 1983

Article 1

Subject to compliance with the provisions of international conventions to which Lebanon is a party or signatory, the width of (Lebanon’s) territorial waters is hereby fixed at 12 nautical miles from the seashore, starting from the lowest level of ebb tide.

Article 2

The creation within territorial waters of areas that are out of bounds to ships and the specification of navigation routes may be effected by virtue of a Council of Ministers decree issued on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Works and Transport and the Ministers of Finance and National Defence.

The above-mentioned decree shall specify the types of vessels affected by the provisions of this Legislative Decree.

Article 3

Every infringement of the provisions of article 2 above is punishable by a fine ranging from five thousand to twenty thousand Lebanese pounds. Subject to a decision by the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the offender may also be disrupted and the ship banned entry into Lebanese ports.

The collection of fines shall be effected in accordance with laws and regulations in force.

In the event of other laws and regulations in force being violated, the application of the penalty provided for in this Legislative Decree shall not prevent the imposition of the penalty provided for in those laws and regulations.
حنبوب حديد

4832

تشخيص حوض النقطة الإستراتيجية للبترول في لبنان

القرار رقم 6433 - تفويض وزير البترول

القرار رقم 6433 - تفويض وزير البترول

اطلاعات

Articles

1. اتفاقية تفويض رئيسة:

2. تعريف التفويض:

3. شروط التفويض:

4. تفويض رئيس:

5. إجراءات تفعيل التفويض:

6. تعويضات:

7. إلغاء التفويض.

Lebanese Petroleum Law

 Officials

1. State officials

2. Municipal officials

3. Employees

4. Delegation (Commission)

5. The Ministry

6. The Parliament

7. The Reserve

Annexes 66

Annexes 67

Annexes

Annexes

Annexes
Annexes 4- Maps

Maritime Borders Agreements

**Lebanon**
- January 2007: Lebanon and Cyprus EEZ border agreement with the southern border left for negotiation. Cyprus ratified the agreement Lebanon didn’t as not to antagonize Turkey. Turkey does not acknowledge any zoning or Actions by Cyprus in light of the conflict between the two states.
- Lebanon and Syria did not complete the demarcation of their land and their maritime borders.
- Mid 2011: A tripartite committee is negotiating EEZ boundaries between Lebanon and Israel.

**Israel**
- September 2010: Israel and Cyprus sign and ratify an agreement on the delimitation of their EEZ and exploration rights.
- Israel and Egypt have an unwritten understanding on maritime borders.
- Israel and Jordan sign an understanding delimiting maritime borders at the Gulf of Aqaba.
- Israel unilaterally defined its maritime boundary with Gaza Strip.

**Cyprus**
- February 2003: Cyprus and Egypt sign an agreement on the delimitation of their EEZ. It was ratified by both parties in 2004.
- Cyprus unilaterally marked its maritime boundary with Gaza Strip.

**Egypt**
- Egypt unilaterally marked its maritime boundary with Gaza Strip.

Seismic Surveys

According to CGGVeritas, the data shows key seismic indicators including bright spots, flat spots, gas chimneys and denning which point to the presence of an active petroleum system.

In 2005, in cooperation with the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, CGGVeritas acquired, processed and interpreted regional 2D seismic survey over offshore Syria. MC2D Syr2005: 5,000 km 2D Interpretation package Reprocessed seismic dataset

1st Licensing Round 2007
- Based on the CGGVeritas MC2D-Syria 2005 survey and Interpretation Report
- One bid was submitted
- No blocks were awarded

2nd Licensing Round March 2011
- The Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources along with the General Petroleum Corporation (GPC) announced on the 24th March 2011 the opening of the International Bid Round 2011:
  - Based on the CGGVeritas MC2D-Syria 2005 survey and Interpretation Report
  - A minimum of 3,000 km of this data must be licensed by each oil company interest in bidding
  - Includes three offshore blocks
  - Closing date: October 2011

Activities Halted Following Break of Conflict in Syria
- Comparison between Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon
- Milestones Lebanon
Current production

1. Marie-B
   - Block: 14/07
   - Discovery: 2000
   - Estimated Capacity: 30 bcm of Gas
   - Commercial production: since 2004
   - Rights: Lease 02/12/2000 - 01/12/2030
   - Consortium: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.
   - Delek Drilling Ltd. Partn. / Avner Oil Ltd. Partn.
   - Concession: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.
   - Estimated Capacity: 7.6 bcm of Gas
   - Total Gas: 1,574,800,000 m³
   - Commercial Production: 2015 - 2017
   - Estimated capacity: 450 bcm of Gas
   - Discovery: December 2010
   - Block: 350/349

2. Dalit
   - Block: 11/12
   - Discovery: March 2009
   - Estimated Capacity: 7.6 bcm of Gas
   - Commercial production: Planned for early 2013
   - Rights: Lease 02/12/2008 - 01/12/2038
   - Consortium: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.
   - Delek Drilling Ltd. Partn. / Avner Oil Ltd. Partn.
   - Concession: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.

3. Leviathan
   - Block: 351/19
   - Discovery: December 2010
   - Estimated Capacity: 455 bcm of Gas
   - Commercial production: 2011 - 2017
   - Rights: Lease 02/12/2008 - 01/12/2038
   - Consortium: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.
   - Delek Drilling Ltd. Partn. / Avner Oil Ltd. Partn.
   - Concession: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.

Current potential exploration

1. Tanin
   - Block: 364/365
   - Discovery: February 2012
   - Estimated Capacity: 7.6 bcm of Gas
   - Exploration: 2012-2017
   - Rights: Lease 17/02/2009 - 16/02/2013
   - Consortium: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.
   - Delek Drilling Ltd. Partn. / Avner Oil Ltd. Partn.
   - Concession: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.

2. Dolphin
   - Block: 311
   - Discovery: February 2012
   - Estimated Capacity: 3.6 bcm of Gas
   - Exploration: 2012-2017
   - Rights: Lease 17/02/2008 - 16/02/2013
   - Consortium: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.
   - Delek Drilling Ltd. Partn. / Avner Oil Ltd. Partn.
   - Concession: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.

3. Adele
   - Block: 38
   - Discovery: Estimated Capacity: 2012-2013
   - Rights: Lease 17/02/2008 - 16/02/2013
   - Consortium: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.
   - Delek Drilling Ltd. Partn. / Avner Oil Ltd. Partn.
   - Concession: Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd.

Petroleum rights

The Ministry of National Infrastructure encourages exploration, providing both geological and geographical data which have been obtained from previous exploration surveys and government research. Exploration and production (E&P) is controlled by the Petroleum Law which defines three rights:

1. A Hydrocarbon Prospection License, issued a maximum of ten years.
2. A Hydrocarbon Exploration License is granted for an initial period of three years and may be renewed for up to two terms.
3. A Hydrocarbon Exploitation License, with respect to a commercial discovery during exploration, shall be granted after the approval of a Development and Production Plan.

Exploration License

A Hydrocarbon Exploration License is granted for a period not exceeding twenty-five years and may be renewed for a maximum of ten years.

Exploitation License

A Hydrocarbon Exploitation License is granted for a period not exceeding twenty-five years and may be renewed for a maximum of ten years.

Exploration licences are valid for a commercial discovery during exploration, shall be granted after the approval of a Development and Production Plan.

Provision license

The hydrocarbon Prospection License, issued a maximum of three years, after the conclusion of the initial evaluation stage, is the right to exploit using various geophysical techniques (no drilling) and evaluating the offshore Cyprus hydrocarbon potential by identifying geological structures.
Seismic Surveys
According to Petroleum Geo-Services, the deep water area of offshore Lebanon in the Eastern Mediterranean covers more than 20,000 sq. km and offers a variety of unexplored hydrocarbon plays, including; the Syrian Arc, the Levantine Basin and the Levant Margin. In cooperation with the Ministry of Energy and Water of the Republic of Lebanon, PGS acquired, processed and interpreted a MC2D GeoStreamer program, covering attractive leads and giving valuable information about the area of offshore Lebanon. A data room has been set up in 2011 in the MEW:
- MC3D-LEB2006: 1,550 sq. km
- MC3D-LEB2007: 660 sq. km
- MC2D-LEB2008: 5,000 line km
- MC2D-LEB2011: 3,814 line km
- MC3D-LEB2011: 1,395 sq. km
- MC3D LEB 2012: 2,800 sq. km

First Licensing Round
Licensing rounds postponed to 2013 due to delays in the formation of the Petroleum Administration

Oil and Gas Milestones
- January 2007: Lebanon signs EEZ agreement with Cyprus. Agreement was never ratified by Lebanon.
- August 2010: Parliament endorsed Offshore Petroleum Resources law
- October 2010: Lebanon submits EEZ boundary coordinates with Occupied Palestine to the UN
- August 2011: Parliament endorsed law on the delimitation of Lebanon’s EEZ
- February 2012: Petroleum Law Guidelines
- October 2012: Appointment of Petroleum Administration
- 2013: Opening of 1st licensing round

Pending
- Delimitation agreements with neighboring countries
- Decrees based on the Petroleum Law Guidelines
- Maritime legislation in conformity with UNCLOS
- Licensing strategy (shape of blocks, etc)
- Evaluation criteria (financial, technical, legal, environmental)
- Bidding items (profit share, work program, recovery ceiling)
- Gas Policy (domestic consumption, infrastructure, etc)

Petroleum Law
Reconnaissance License
- Granted for up to 3 years; Shall not be exclusive and shall not give the Right Holder any preference with regards to obtaining any other Petroleum Right;
- The resulting data shall be the property of the State

Exploration License
- The Exploration phase is up to 10 years; The duration of each phase is stipulated in the EPA;
- On each renewal, at least 50 % of the initial area is relinquished;
- Transfer or assignment of Petroleum Right may be granted by the Council of Ministers

Production License
- The production phase is up to 30 years
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-2007</td>
<td>Further seismic surveys conducted by other companies. Data indicates the presence of considerable hydrocarbon resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2014</td>
<td>Lebanon deposited Southern part of the Western median line of its EEZ (bordering Occupied Palestine) at the office of the UN Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Lebanon signed EEZ delimitation agreement with Egypt. Agreement has not been ratified yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>First petroleum law drafted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>Petroleum Geo- Services (PGS) oil data company conducts geological seismic surveys that confirm oil deposits in Lebanese waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Southampton Oceanographic Center tasked with delimiting Lebanon's EEZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Council of Ministers passed the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>August: Parliament endorsed the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Lebanon deposited coordinates that define the Southern limit of Lebanon's EEZ (bordering Occupied Palestine) at the office of the UN Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>A commission composed of specialists from Lebanon's army, foreign ministry and the National Council of Scientific Research was commissioned to delimit maritime boundaries with Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>July: Lebanese addresses letter to UN Secretary-General ascertaining that point 1 does not represent the southern end of the median line that separates the EEZ boundary with neighboring countries, &amp; claiming that the Lebanese EEZ terminates at point 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>August: Parliament endorsed law on the delimitation of Lebanon's EEZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>September: Lebanon sends letter to the office of the UN Secretary-General objecting to the EEZ agreement that was signed between Cyprus and Israel in December 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>September: UKHO endorses mapping of EEZ by the Lebanese Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>February: Lebanon expected to commence licensing and bidding rounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Discovery of Tanin field. Production expected to commence in 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Gas extraction expected to begin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Council of Ministers passed the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Interim solution to meet domestic demand in Cyprus by transporting natural gas from Israel is currently under evaluation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Cyprus issued a law to provide for the delimitation of its EEZ boundary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Cyprus signed EEZ delimitation agreement with Egypt. The agreement entered into force in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Cyprus ratified EEZ delimitation agreement with Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Gas extraction expected to begin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>